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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General hereby transmits the report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization on the lessons learned in the public health emergency response to and management of previous international crises with health consequences, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/183.

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Report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization on the lessons learned in the public health emergency response to and management of previous international crises with health consequences

Summary

The present report provides an overview of lessons learned in the public health emergency response to and management of previous international crises with health consequences, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/183. The report provides a synthesis of recent experience and draws findings from various reports and assessments of response to the recent Ebola outbreak.

I. Introduction

1. Recent outbreaks and emergencies with health consequences, including the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the ongoing Zika epidemic, highlighted the importance of global emergency preparedness and response capacity. In addition to their profound health consequences, outbreaks and pandemics pose a serious threat to global health security, development advances and economic stability. The World Bank estimates that the annual global cost of moderately severe to severe outbreaks is roughly $570 billion, or 0.7 per cent of global income.

2. In the past two years, countries have reaffirmed their political commitment to building the core capacities needed to prevent, detect and respond to emergencies with health consequences, in line with the obligations under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). Multilateral regional and international entities have prioritized the expansion of their own emergencies capacities and the establishment of new cooperative arrangements. To ensure that this agenda is successful and sustainable, substantial financial resources have been pledged.

3. This momentum must not be lost. At the same time, to ensure maximum effectiveness and improved efficiencies, this work must be thoughtfully shaped and undertaken at the local, national and international levels in the light of past experiences. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/183, this report provides an overview of lessons learned in the public health emergency response to and management of previous international crises with health consequences and notes examples of progress in each of the overarching areas.

II. Reviews

4. The Ebola crisis in West Africa sparked international scrutiny of the preparedness of the world and the World Health Organization (WHO) for health crises and their capacity to respond to health crises. A number of reviews were performed to determine why the Ebola outbreak reached the levels that it did and to articulate the recommended corrective actions and reforms that need to take place to help prevent similar events in future. These reviews concretize the lessons of past responses and provide guidance for efforts at all levels to safeguard against, and prepare for, future emergencies with health consequences.

5. The reviews noted the challenges of the Ebola response. However, they also stressed the need for coordinated international action and high-level, sustained political and financial commitments to improve global capacities to deal with future emergencies with health consequences. They acknowledge that the bedrock of outbreak and emergency preparedness and response is a functioning, resilient national health system — with service delivery, financing, human resources, infrastructure, information and supply management systems capable of detecting and responding to public health events at the national and subnational levels. The reports emphasized the critical role of WHO in providing leadership, technical expertise and coordination in managing outbreaks and emergencies with health consequences, including natural disasters and conflict.

6. The present report synthesizes recent experience and draws on the findings in those reports, including:

(a) Report of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises (A/70/723) established by the Secretary-General;

(b) Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel,[1] commissioned by the Executive Board of the World Health Organization;

(c) Reports of the Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies,[2] established by the Director-General of WHO;

(d) Report of the Secretary-General on the lessons learned exercise on the coordination activities of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (A/70/737 and Corr.1);

(e) Report of the Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response;[3]

(f) Report of the Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola,[4] convened jointly by the Harvard Global Health Institute and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine;

(g) Report of the Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future,[5] convened by the National Academy of Medicine of the United States of America;

(h) "Toward a common secure future: four global commissions in the wake of Ebola".[6]

III. Functioning, resilient national health systems

7. Communities and national and subnational health workforce members are on the front line of identifying and responding to any health crisis. A central theme of all of the studies and assessments was that functioning, resilient national health systems are essential for effective action across the health risk management cycle. The integration of health security functions and health systems promotes sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness of a country's preparedness and response

[1] See http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/report-by-panel.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 2 May 2016).

[2] For the Advisory Group's terms of reference, membership and reports, see http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/advisory-group/en/ (accessed 2 May 2016).

[3] See http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/A69_21-en.pdf (accessed 16 May 2016).

[4] Suerie Moon and others, "Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic: report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola", *Lancet*, vol. 386, No. 10009 (28 November 2015), pp. 2204–2221. Available at http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736%2815%2900946-0.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016).

[5] See http://www.nap.edu/catalog/21891/the-neglected-dimension-of-global-security-a-framework-to-counter (accessed 2 May 2016).

[6] Lawrence O. Gostin and others, "Toward a common secure future: four global commissions in the wake of Ebola", *PLoS Med*, vol. 13, No. 5 (2016).

capacity, while also strengthening the wider health system in support of Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable Development Goals.

8. The centrality of national health capacities in emergency risk management was acknowledged on a global scale as much as 10 years earlier, during the negotiations of IHR (2005). Legally binding on 196 countries, the purpose and scope of the Regulations are to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. This scope covers illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans.

9. Under its terms, each State party is obligated to develop, strengthen and maintain the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events and respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern. The Regulations also require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to WHO and establish a number of procedures that WHO must follow in its work to uphold global public health security.

10. Many countries, however, have not been able to develop the core capacities called for under IHR (2005). As early as three years before the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, a review of IHR implementation exposed vulnerabilities in national and local public health capacities.[7]

11. Countries need to recognize and prioritize IHR (2005) and fully implement core capacities, including effective surveillance, detection and response capacities. This will require increased funding and collaboration between countries and development agencies. Strengthening core capacities in resource-constrained countries must go hand in hand with overall strengthening of the health system itself.

12. A key element of ensuring that these core capacities are both developed and maintained will be the establishment of a cycle of assessment, action and reassessment. WHO, in collaboration with partners and initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda, developed the Joint External Evaluation Tool process and the tool itself[8] as part of the IHR (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework.

IV. A new Health Emergencies Programme for WHO

13. While WHO successes in the Ebola response have been acknowledged, its shortcomings were also widely discussed. Nonetheless, the critical role of WHO in providing leadership, technical expertise and coordination in managing outbreaks and emergencies with health consequences, including natural disasters and conflict, was uniformly affirmed in all the reviews, with the accompanying recommendation

[7] See document A64/10, entitled "Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the IHR (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009". Available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_10-en.pdf.

[8] See http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204368/1/9789241510172_eng.pdf.

that WHO reform its emergencies capacities to become the Organization the world wants and needs, fit for purpose in the context of health crises.

14. WHO is committed to the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. A core component of this objective is the WHO mandate to provide technical assistance and aid in emergencies. To fulfil this mandate, WHO needs sufficient operational capability to lead and support preparations for, and responses to, outbreaks and emergencies with health consequences.

15. WHO has established a new Health Emergencies Programme, complementing its traditional technical and normative strengths with operational capacities for its work in outbreaks and humanitarian emergencies. The Programme represents a fundamental development for the Organization. It is designed to bring speed and predictability to the emergency work of WHO, using an all-hazards approach, promoting collective action and encompassing preparedness, readiness, response and early recovery activities.

16. Through the Programme, WHO will work across the risk management cycle in support of people at risk of or affected by outbreaks and other emergencies, addressing all health hazards in a predictable, capable, dependable, adaptable and accountable manner.

V. Improved coordination

17. The international community has put in place coordination mechanisms to ensure effective emergency response. Specifically, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, established in 1992 in response to General Assembly resolution 46/182 on strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations. It is a unique forum involving the key United Nations and other humanitarian partners.

18. IASC has reinforced the global emergency response capacity according to an agreed division of labour, which is manifested in the cluster system. However, in the context of health crises, the Committee members and partners do not have substantial experience in managing infectious hazards. For this reason and in the light of the humanitarian community being overstretched with multiple Grade 3 crises to respond to an outbreak, the clusters were largely not activated during the Ebola outbreak, despite it having been declared a public health emergency of international concern by the WHO Director-General.

19. The spread of Ebola in West Africa outpaced the capacity of WHO and front-line responders to put in place the logistical, medical and material capacities needed to stem the spread of the virus. As a result, in September 2014, the Secretary-General established the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first ever United Nations emergency health mission to coordinate international support for nationally led response efforts.

20. Following the decommissioning of UNMEER, many expressed the view that the implementation of its mandate or the structure of the Mission could have been improved. However, it was also noted that the strategic benefits that UNMEER

brought to the response in terms of leadership, facilitation, logistics and immediate funding added substantial value. Many studies endorsed an improved and streamlined model that would combine the critical components of an immediate influx of resources, empowered leadership and logistical support with a light structural footprint, building upon existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms and in-country capacities. Such an approach would allow the system to exercise flexibility in adjusting and adapting existing operational coordination and response systems to address the specificities of health crises as they unfold.

21. In July 2016, IASC agreed that WHO and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat would lead a process of extending and adapting current IASC mechanisms for managing humanitarian crises to facilitate coordination of support for large-scale outbreaks, with adjustments for the particular characteristics and challenges of infectious hazard management. The new infectious hazard management standard operating procedures have been reviewed by the IASC Emergency Director Group and are scheduled to be considered by the IASC Principals in early December 2016.

VI. Sustainable, scalable and predictable financing

22. Financing emergency preparedness and response for outbreaks and pandemics has been central to the international discourse on emergency reform. Building a more effective system, at the national, regional and international levels, to detect and respond to health crises will require substantial, sustained investment. These investments will be small compared with the benefits to be reaped and will provide an opportunity to avoid the potentially devastating financial losses associated with major public health crises.

23. At the national level, financing constitutes a key constraint in meeting IHR (2005) core capacity obligations. While all countries have been encouraged to allocate a greater proportion of their national budgets to the health sector, including building core capacities, assessments suggest that many countries will require significant international assistance. To this end, the Global Health Security Agenda partner countries have committed themselves to assisting 30 countries in developing their core capacities, and other related health systems elements. The Ministers of Health of the Group of Seven agreed to offer to assist 76 countries, including the countries of West Africa, over the next five years to implement IHR (2005), including through the Global Health Security Agenda and its common targets and other multilateral initiatives.

24. To complement these efforts to finance preparedness, WHO and the World Bank Group have been requested to work together with partners to identify additional sources of financial and technical support to ensure that all countries participating in a periodic review of compliance with IHR (2005) requirements can enjoy guaranteed financial support as needed. This work is under way.

25. It is widely acknowledged that WHO will have two significant financial needs. The first is adequate resources to support its new Health Emergencies Programme. Even if all countries achieve compliance with the core capacities requirements, strong central operational capacity to rapidly respond in case of major outbreaks

that could not be contained by the country alone will be required. In this regard, WHO has mapped financial requirements to all of the new Health Emergencies Programme's deliverables. Sustainable, predictable funding will require an increase in core organizational funds being dedicated to health emergency management, highlighting the WHO critical emergencies functions in its financing dialogues, which have successfully changed its ability to predict and ensure adequate financing in each biennial fiscal cycle.

26. Studies have also indicated that WHO requires financing for its emergency response work. Until recently, WHO emergency response activities relied on voluntary funding, as there were very little immediately available standing resources, increasing the risk of delayed and poorly coordinated responses. To respond to this need, in 2015 WHO member States established the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies, with a target capitalization of $100 million. In September 2016, pledges and contributions to the Fund totalled $31.5 million.

27. Lastly, a gap in response financing at the national level was identified by the various studies. In particular, it was noted that for particularly severe outbreaks, there is no rapidly available surge financing. In response to this need, the World Bank has developed the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility, using a combination of concessional financing instruments and innovative insurance mechanisms to make funds available to affected countries as soon as predefined criteria related to an outbreak are met to provide them financial assistance in the early days of a crisis.

VII. New platforms for research and innovation

28. The availability of effective medical countermeasures, including vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, is crucial in preventing and responding to communicable disease outbreaks. However, current, market-driven models of medical research and development do not cater for diseases that are sporadic or unpredictable, especially when they occur in countries with low investment in health infrastructure and delivery. Of the $214 billion invested in health research and development globally in 2010, less than 2 per cent was allocated to neglected diseases. The challenges are greater when confronted with a new disease such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and Nipah virus infection. These challenges were made tangible and clear in the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, at the start of which the international community did not possess much needed interventions to rapidly diagnose and safely and effectively treat or prevent the disease in humans. Even where vaccines or therapeutics exist, they are often inaccessible or unaffordable to vulnerable populations.

29. The WHO secretariat, in consultation with member States and relevant stakeholders, has engaged in the development of a blueprint for accelerating research and development in epidemics or health emergency situations where there are no, or insufficient, medical countermeasures. The blueprint will map options to proactively ensure that countermeasures (such as drugs, vaccines, diagnostics and behavioural interventions) will be available in a timely manner for the next infectious disease threat and that the global health research infrastructure is primed for immediate response during a health emergency.

30. Stakeholders from international organizations, Governments, industry, public and philanthropic research and development funders, academia, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups agreed at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, in 2016 to explore new ways of working to drive vaccine innovation to address public health threats and establish the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations in alignment with the WHO Research and Development Blueprint.

31. Commitments made at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), held in Nairobi in August 2016, included $25 billion from the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and Japan's commitment of $1.1 billion to relevant institutions including WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance.

VIII. Conclusion

32. The lessons learned from the Ebola crisis and earlier emergencies with health consequences all emphasize the need for adequate national and global preparation, which will in turn create the necessary foundation for predictable, adaptable and accountable response. The recommendations emerging from lessons learned (see annex) give structure to the collective, national and international efforts to ensure that the world is better positioned to detect and manage any future health crisis.

33. The General Assembly is invited to take note of this report.

Annex

Recommendations to the World Health Organization on its work in health emergencies and its response to those recommendations

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
Establish a dedicated WHO structure for work across the emergency and outbreak risk management cycle	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel[a]	WHO should establish a WHO Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, which will be based on the currently separate outbreak control and humanitarian areas of work. This WHO Centre will need to develop new organizational structures and procedures to achieve full preparedness and response capacity. WHO must develop an organizational culture that accepts its role in emergency preparedness and response.	Document EB138/55, paras. 5-8;[b] Global Policy Group Statement, paras. 2-5;[c] Progress Report, paras. 8-13;[d] and document A69/30, paras. 2-4[e]
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies[f]	*First report*: WHO should immediately establish a centrally managed, global Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies Management.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises[g]	WHO should immediately strengthen its leadership and establish a unified, effective operational capacity … The Panel proposes that such a Programme become a Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response with command and control authority.	Based on member State feedback, the Director-General has elected to move forward with a Programme rather than a Centre. This signifies full integration of the work of WHO in the health emergency management cycle within the Organization.
	Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response[h]	A tiered emergency response structure with strong linkages to both internal and external partners should be instituted, with clear, documented structures and processes for command and control, accountability and leadership.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola[i]	WHO should create a unified WHO Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response with clear responsibility, adequate capacity and strong lines of accountability.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future[j]	By the end of 2016, WHO should create a Centre for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response — integrating action at the headquarters, regional and country office levels — to lead the global effort towards outbreak preparedness and response.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
Articulate clear lines of authority and accountability in the WHO health emergencies structure	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	In an emergency, the head of the Centre would need full operational authority.	Document EB138/55, paras. 12-13;
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: The Director-General should undertake appropriate consultations with the Global Policy Group on outbreak and emergency issues. The Executive Director should be responsible and accountable for centralized management of the budget and human resources of the Programme.	Global Policy Group Statement, paras. 5-6; Progress Report, paras. 10-12; and document A69/30, paras. 5-8
		Second report: With respect to the lines of authority in incident management:	
		(a) The Director-General remains ultimately accountable for incident management within WHO;	
		...	
		(e) WHO should build the capacity of its staff in humanitarian partner coordination and response so that they can function more successfully within an incident management system.	The Director-General will delegate oversight and management of Grade 2 crises to the Executive Director or the respective Regional Director, depending on the nature of health emergency and the degree of internationally coordinated support required.
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	• The Centre is the central command and control mechanism in health emergencies. It should have clear lines of authority within the organization.	
		• During a health crisis, the Centre takes full authority for the Health Cluster response and liaises closely with the Government and all actors.	
		• In a Grade 2 or Grade 3 outbreak not already classified as a humanitarian emergency, a clear line of command will be activated throughout the United Nations system...	
	IHR Review Committee	WHO should balance a strong, decisive, accountable, multi-level programme with the strengths of the established working relationships that States parties have with country and regional offices.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	WHO should clearly designate the Centre's operational lines of authority from headquarters to regions and countries.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	WHO should merge health security and emergencies functions and integrate under the Centre's command-and-control structure. Regional Directors should have "dotted-line" geographic oversight of regional functions. Comparable, contextualized systems should be set up at the national level.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
Ensure financing for the WHO health emergencies structure	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	At the meetings of the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly meetings in 2016, member States should reconsider moving from the policy of zero nominal growth to increase assessed contributions by 5 per cent.	Document EB138/55, para. 18; Progress Report, paras. 19-22; and document A69/30, paras. 20-22
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: The Programme will require "steady state" financing. *Second report*: The transformation required for WHO to perform its core functions in outbreaks and emergencies will require a significant increase in staff and financial resources. ... WHO should use existing resources efficiently and prioritize, articulate the linkages between resources and outcomes, identify benchmarks to assess progress and rigorously track expenditure. WHO needs to consider new ways to engage with different donors and stakeholders.	In the biennium 2016-2017, there is no request for an increase in assessed contributions, and in the biennium 2018-2019 there will be no changes in assessed contributions for Categories 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Centre should be funded from assessed contributions. Member States should increase their assessed contributions by at least 10 per cent and 10 per cent of all voluntary contributions to WHO — beyond programme support costs — should mandatorily support the Centre. The Centre should also have access to the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility if triggered.	
	IHR Review Committee	The WHO response to emergencies and to IHR should be a continued priority, and resources should be appropriately allocated to ensure the rapid success of the new Programme. Starting in 2017, core contributions to WHO should increase to establish an effective risk assessment, risk management and risk communication programme for health emergencies.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	The Centre's budget should be protected and adequately resourced through a dedicated revolving fund. The fund should immediately disburse money for rapid scale-up when a crisis strikes, then be replenished from funds raised for that crisis to be ready for the next one.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	In May 2016, the World Health Assembly should agree to an appropriate increase in WHO member States' core contributions to provide sustainable financing for the Centre.	
Establish, capitalize and manage a WHO emergency contingency fund	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	Member States and partners should contribute immediately to the contingency fund, with a target capitalization of $100 million fully funded by voluntary contributions.	Document EB138/55, para. 11; Progress Report, paras. 7 and 23; and document A69/30, paras. 11, 17, 19 and 21
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*Second report*: For funding to support emergency operations, WHO should maximize its use of existing mechanisms like the Central Emergency Response Fund and actively seek full capitalization of the Contingency Fund for Emergencies.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	Member States should finance the WHO Contingency Fund with at least $300 million by the end of 2016. To ensure predictable financing, the Contingency Fund should be fully funded by member States according to the scale of their current assessment and immediately replenished when depleted. The Fund's resources should also be available to other health responders.	The Independent Panel did not speak on this area.
	IHR Review Committee	Starting from 2017, increase contributions to WHO, to allow the establishment of a programme for health emergencies, including a WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	By the end of 2016, WHO should create and fund a sustainable contingency fund of $100 million to support rapid deployment of emergency response capabilities through one-off contributions or commitments proportional to assessed contributions from member States.	
Identify lead for the WHO health emergencies structure	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	The Head must be a strong leader and a strategic thinker, with political, diplomatic, crisis coordination, organizational and managerial skills, able to make sound decisions quickly; able to discern when to move to rapid response; and able to coordinate with partners. The post should be advertised.	Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, paras. 3 and 11; and document A69/30, para. 5
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: The Programme should be headed by an Executive Director at the rank of Deputy Director-General who reports to the Director-General.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	The Centre should have its own Executive Director who is accountable for performance jointly to a separate Board of Directors and to the Director-General.	The High-level Panel and the IHR Review Committee did not speak on this area.
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	An Executive Director at the level of Deputy Director-General should lead the Centre, and the post should be filled through external, open recruitment.	
Tailor systems, business processes and standard operating procedures for emergencies for the WHO health emergencies structure	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	The WHO Centre will need to develop new organizational structures and procedures to achieve full preparedness and response capacity. New, simplified systems and processes in administration, human resources and procurement that facilitate rapid action and deployment are required.	Document EB138/55, paras. 14-15; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, paras. 5-7; and document A69/30, paras. 2-4 The High-level Panel, the IHR Review Committee, the Independent Panel and the Commission did not speak on this area.
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: WHO should immediately redesign the WHO human resource management system and transform financial management processes so funds can be promptly disbursed where they are needed. *Second report*: WHO should develop processes specific to its outbreaks and emergencies work to meet performance benchmarks for human resource and financial management. There must be transformational changes, based on a "no-regrets" approach.	
Ensure independent oversight of WHO performance in emergency risk management	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	WHO, through the Director-General, should immediately establish an independent Board to oversee the Centre. It should guide the development of the new Centre and report on its progress to the Executive Board, the World Health Assembly and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The Chair of this Board should provide an annual report on global health security to the Executive Board, the World Health Assembly and the General Assembly.	Document EB138/55, para. 16; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, para. 14; and document A69/30, paras. 13-14
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: An external, independent oversight body should be established by the Director-General to monitor the performance of the Programme using benchmarks established for this purpose.	

Major area	Panel	Specific recommendation	WHO response
		Second report: Observations regarding the following features of an independent oversight body:	The Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee met for the first time on 5 May 2016. Additional meetings were held on 4 and 5 July and 1 September 2016.
		(a) *Composition*: The members of the body should have technical expertise in areas that are relevant to the Programme. The membership should be multisectoral and could be drawn from member States, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society, the private sector and the United Nations system. Members would exercise their responsibilities individually and independently;	
		(b) *Functions*: The functions could include monitoring and advising on the implementation of the Programme, examining the sufficiency of resources available for the Programme, monitoring the application of lessons learned to adaptation of the Programme and providing observations on the strengthening of health systems and global health security;	The IHR Review Committee did not speak on this area.
		(c) *Reporting*: Where the procedures of the United Nations and WHO governing bodies do not allow for the oversight body to directly submit reports, such reports could be taken into consideration and appropriately reflected by WHO in its reporting to these bodies.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Centre should be guided by an independent Advisory Board, composed of representatives of other United Nations emergency response organizations, national Governments, NGOs in the health sector and other institutional partners, to ensure broad input into the Centre's situational assessments and to reduce misjudgements or political interference. The Advisory Board members should have access to WHO surveillance data and should provide input to the Centre's assessments and response.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	The Executive Director should be accountable for performance jointly to a separate Board of Directors and to the Director-General. The Board should include broad representation of Governments from each WHO region, scientific expertise, including about animal health, operational responders from all sectors and funders. The Executive Director should inform the Board immediately when the Centre's risk analysis suggests that coordinated international action is needed and should mobilize an appropriate response.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	The Executive Director should report to a merit-based and multidisciplinary technical governing board. The technical governing board should be chaired by the Director-General, who should nominate members strictly on the basis of their technical expertise, not on the basis of member State representation. Members should come from various countries, regions and sectors, including civil society organizations, academia and the private sector. Additionally, the technical governing board should include representatives from the United Nations and possibly the World Bank to enable multisectoral support and coordination of the WHO efforts.	
Coordinate the global health emergency workforce as part of the WHO health emergencies structure	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	Standby capacity needs to be put in place across WHO and its partners, including the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), and there should be pre-agreed arrangements for emergency medical teams. The global health emergency workforce needs to be pre-qualified, fully trained, on standby and familiar with its roles.	
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: GOARN needs to be strengthened, including training members in teams and involving them in joint risk assessments to enhance readiness to deploy. WHO should establish new arrangements and partnerships so that personnel can be engaged from partners. Existing networks of expertise should be utilized more effectively and predictably. *Second report*: WHO needs to undertake a stakeholder analysis of partners that contribute to the global health emergency workforce and to identify and establish relationships with national workforces and support them through training and	Document EB138/55, para. 7; Progress Report, para. 15; and document A69/30, paras. 15 and 18

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
		technical guidance. WHO is responsible for coordinating international health actors and ensuring adherence to common standards when deployed. WHO should strengthen operational support to networks deployed through WHO and must define and promote common standards for health interventions, information-sharing and handling personal health data.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Centre houses a workforce deployment management unit, including GOARN and emergency medical teams, which coordinates the Global Emergency Health Workforce, deploying experts and emergency medical teams as needed.	
	IHR Review Committee	WHO should strengthen its partnerships with GOARN, civil society organizations and key private sector stakeholders to enhance WHO surveillance, risk assessment and risk communication capacity. WHO should identify military medical staff available to be deployed, with the host country agreement, to provide medical care to civilian health-care workers in significant infectious disease outbreaks. Such teams should be available in all WHO regions. This should be linked to the WHO work on the global health emergency workforce.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	The Centre should be able to assemble the world's best expertise to tackle disease threats and should develop protocols, build relationships and negotiate agreements with Governments and partners to mobilize rapidly, including strengthening capacities in developing countries to better respond nationally and participate internationally. It should set standards for certifying crisis responders, from communications experts and logisticians to surgeons and managers.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	The Centre should coordinate the global health emergency workforce and should strengthen and expand GOARN, integrating national, regional and global capabilities to reduce over-reliance on a limited group of partners.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
Increase WHO capacity in independent, reliable risk assessment and in information management and sharing	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	All levels of WHO should be strengthened to increase the Organization's ability to independently identify health risks and to declare health emergencies. WHO must re-establish itself as the authoritative body communicating on health emergencies. It must fulfil its role in rapidly, fully and accurately informing Governments and the public about the extent and severity of an outbreak.	EB138/55, paras. 7 and 10-11; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, paras. 5-6; and document A69/30, paras. 2-4
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: WHO should lead independent and comprehensive risk assessments to assist countries in preparing and responding to outbreaks and emergencies. These will be undertaken with affected country authorities and partners to determine the necessary alert level, action to be triggered and how risks are communicated. Where national authorities are not in a position to participate, WHO would perform this function with local, national and international actors. *Second report*: Conducting independent risk assessments is a critical function of the Programme. Risk assessments should be done at all levels of WHO and are a core capacity of all States under IHR. The Director-General should be able to trigger an independent risk assessment.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Centre should establish a transparent protocol to activate an immediate response to outbreaks and to call on political action where obstacles delay or prevent international action. The Centre should house an open data platform that will collect, manage and analyse public data on epidemiological events globally and be responsible for making these data publicly available.	
	IHR Review Committee	WHO should establish a standing advisory committee to regularly review WHO risk assessment and risk communication; create an intermediate level of alert called an International Public Health Alert; and develop an updated communication strategy.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	The Centre should assess risks on the basis of information that countries and others provide and have powerful analytical, data-processing and advisory capacity to command respect in policy and scientific communities.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	By the end of 2016, WHO should establish a mechanism to generate a daily high-priority "watch list" of outbreaks that could potentially become a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), to normalize the process of outbreak reporting by country and to encourage necessary preparedness activities. The WHO Centre should have robust capabilities to manage surveillance for outbreaks and events, assessment of IHR functions and compliance and risk communication.	
Strengthen WHO work as Health Cluster Lead in the context of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: WHO should demonstrate a commitment to strong, consistent and visible leadership of the Global Health Cluster and to more active engagement with IASC. *Second report*: In its Country Offices, WHO should undertake analyses of stakeholders on the ground, work with Health Cluster partners to build Cluster capacities and ensure their integration in emergency operations, and articulate the linkages between the Programme, the Health Clusters and the humanitarian coordination system.	Document EB138/55, para. 16; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, para. 14; and document A69/30, paras. 13-14
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	During a health crisis, the Centre takes full authority for the Health Cluster response and liaises closely with the Government and all actors. The creation of the Centre must therefore lead to stronger, more inclusive and independent leadership of the Health Cluster.	The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, the IHR Review Committee, the Independent Panel and the Commission did not speak on this area.
Ensure WHO capacity to provide technical leadership and coordination in large-scale health emergencies	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: Coordinating international support and operations in the field; convening health actors; promoting harmonization and synergy around a common plan and agreed outcomes; and facilitating alignment on public health and patient care are critical functions of WHO. *Second report*: WHO should build its staff's capacity in humanitarian partner coordination and response to engage in outbreaks and emergencies and function in incident management systems.	Document EB138/55, para. 16; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, para. 14; and document A69/30, paras. 13-14
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	In situations where a health crisis is the root cause of a broader humanitarian emergency, the Centre should play a lead role in the coordination of an inclusive inter-agency response.	The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel did not speak on this area.

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	IHR Review Committee	WHO should use its global coordination mandate to ensure that Global Health Security Agenda and IHR reporting are shared.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	The Centre should develop rapid response and strong coordinating capacity. In a multi-country outbreak, the Centre should ensure Government-to-Government coordination by establishing channels of direct communication for rapid information sharing.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	By the end of 2016, the United Nations and WHO should establish clear mechanisms for coordination and escalation in health crises, including those that become or are part of broader humanitarian crises requiring mobilization of the entire United Nations system.	
Align the WHO grading system with that of the global risk management system	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	WHO should consider how to coordinate its own emergency grades and declarations of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) with the emergency levels applied in the broader humanitarian system, in order to facilitate better inter-agency cooperation.	Document EB138/55, para. 16; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 5; Progress Report, para. 14; and document A69/30, paras. 13-14
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*Second report*: It is critical to align the WHO Emergency Response Framework and the grading systems of other United Nations organizations and integrate events that may constitute a PHEIC into the grading system.	The Independent Panel and the Commission did not speak on this area.
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Secretary-General should initiate the integration of health and humanitarian crisis trigger systems. Every health crisis classified as Grade 2 or Grade 3, according to the WHO Emergency Response Framework, should automatically trigger an inter-agency multisectoral assessment.	
	IHR Review Committee	To ensure consistent actions across different levels of risk and to reduce confusion, the relationships between the risk grading and response actions across the Regulations, the updated Emergency Response Framework, and the IASC activation levels should be clearly documented and communicated to all stakeholders.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
Ensure that WHO is able to play a central role in convening and coordinating research and development efforts in emergencies	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	WHO should play a central convening role in research and development efforts in emergencies; including accelerating development of appropriate diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics and medical and information technology.	Document EB138/27, paras. 20-23;[c] Progress Report, para. 14; and document A69/30, paras. 13-14
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: It is critical that WHO ensure the application of the best scientific knowledge of an outbreak in commissioning research and product development, while pushing for innovation.	
		Second report: In developing the Programme, WHO should keep in mind that research and development functions must be incorporated as part of emergency operations.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Centre should be tasked to determine if an outbreak necessitates accelerated research and development on medical countermeasures such as diagnostics, therapeutics or vaccines and should work closely with the relevant WHO department in coordinating measures to support such research.	The IHR Review Committee did not speak on this area.
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	WHO should convene Governments, the scientific research community, industry and NGOs to begin developing a framework of norms and rules for research relevant to disease outbreaks.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	WHO should establish an independent pandemic product development committee to convene regulatory agencies, industry stakeholders and research organizations.	
Articulate the role of WHO Country Offices in the context of health emergencies	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	When a health emergency occurs, the Country Representative must be able to work across all Ministries. The WHO Country Representative must have an independent voice to communicate accurate risk assessments that may not always be welcomed and must be assured of the full support of the Regional Director and the Director-General when the country is not willing to share information or agree on proposed actions.	Document EB138/55, paras. 9 and 13; and document A69/30, paras. 7 and 9-10
		WHO must adopt a new approach to staffing in country offices, taking into account country circumstances and ensuring the highest level of capacity for the most vulnerable countries … The role of the Country Representative then is to manage key partnerships, support the emergency team and continue to manage other programmes.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: Depending on a given outbreak or emergency, the Country Representative may be appointed as the Incident Manager. The WHO Global Policy Group should encourage WHO Country Representatives and the WHO Programme to prioritize services to people who are in greatest need of assistance and support the Country Representatives and Incident Managers as they negotiate this. *Second report*: Country Representatives and Regional Directors need to be fully engaged in incident management decision-making and within the functioning of the Programme. The operational posture of WHO must be reflected in every aspect of its work, including the positioning of WHO Country Offices.	The IHR Review Committee, the High-level Panel, the Independent Panel and the Commission did not speak on this area.
Increase awareness of and improve implementation of and compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR)	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	The IHR Review Committee for Ebola should consider incentives for encouraging countries to notify public health risks to WHO.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The international community must fulfil the commitments towards the Sustainable Development Goals, with a particular emphasis on health-sector goals. The Statistical Commission, in its deliberations on the indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals, should give consideration to measuring compliance with the IHR core capacity requirements and the strengthening of overall health systems as indicators towards attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals related to health.	Document EB138/27, paras. 15-18; Progress Report, para. 17; and document A69/30, paras. 6 and 9-10
	IHR Review Committee	Awareness and recognition of IHR (2005) should be increased, and the lead role of WHO within the United Nations system in implementing the Regulations should be reaffirmed … WHO should increase transparency about additional measures adopted by States parties, and publicity about temporary recommendations, develop partnerships with international travel and trade organizations and engage with other relevant private stakeholders.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	Incentives for early reporting of outbreaks and science-based justifications for trade and travel restrictions should be strengthened.	The Advisory Group did not speak on this area.

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	By the end of 2016, the World Health Assembly should agree on new mechanisms for holding Governments publicly accountable for performance under IHR (2005) and broader global health risk frameworks, including: • Protocols for avoiding suppression or delays in data and alerts and • Protocols for avoiding unnecessary restrictions on trade or travel	
Conduct assessments, develop costed plans and ensure the development of national core capacity-building under the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR)	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	WHO should propose a prioritized and costed plan, based on independently assessed information, to develop core capacities required under IHR (2005) for all countries.	Document EB138/27, paras. 15-18; Progress Report, para. 17, and document A69/30, paras. 6 and 9-10
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: WHO should join with national authorities at regular intervals to ensure that there are sufficient in-country capabilities in relation to outbreaks and emergencies.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	By 2020, States parties to IHR, with appropriate international cooperation, should be in full compliance with the IHR core capacity requirements. States parties should provide WHO with an annual written assessment of their IHR core capacities. On a rotating basis, each country should be subject to a periodic review. For countries under review, WHO should arrange an independent field-based assessment and coordinate with other reviews. The self-assessment and the WHO-arranged assessment should be presented to the World Health Assembly for discussion. Within three months, WHO should develop a costed action plan for each country based on the discussions. Once a State party has achieved full compliance with IHR core capacity requirements, the periodic review should be broadened to include a wider assessment of its health system.	
	IHR Review Committee	WHO should lead the development of a Global Strategic Plan to improve public health preparedness, to ensure implementation of IHR, especially core capacities. Self-assessment, complemented by external assessment, should be recognized best practice in monitoring and strengthening the implementation of IHR. WHO and States parties should ensure that all health system strengthening	

Major area	Panel	Specific recommendation	WHO response
		programmes specifically address IHR core capacities. WHO must prioritize support in establishing core capacities and detection of public health risks to countries that have extremely low resources, are in the middle of conflict or are considered fragile.	
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	All Governments must agree to regular, independent, external assessment of their core capacities.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	By the end of 2016: (a) WHO, with member States, should develop a precise definition and benchmarks for national core capabilities and functioning under IHR, against which countries will be independently assessed; (b) WHO should devise a regular, independent, transparent and objective assessment to evaluate country performance against the benchmarks; and (c) all countries should commit to participate in the assessment process, including publication of results. WHO should provide technical support to countries to fill gaps in their core capacities and achieve benchmark performance. The Secretary-General should work with WHO and other United Nations partners to develop strategies for sustaining health system capabilities and infrastructure in fragile and failed States and in war zones, to the extent possible.	
Ensure financing for national core capacity development under the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR)	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	WHO and the World Bank should work together on financing the prioritized and costed core capacities plan, which should be submitted to donor agencies, member States and other stakeholders for funding. It could include new types of financing mechanisms.	Document EB138/27, paras. 15-18; Progress Report, para. 17; and A69/30, paras. 6 and 9-10
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	WHO should consolidate a public report on the global state of IHR core capacities and outline an implementation strategy with requirements for international assistance. Domestic and international fund needs to be mobilized to support IHR core capacity implementation. Least developed countries and other vulnerable countries should receive assistance in this regard.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
	IHR Review Committee	WHO, States parties and international development partners should urgently commit to providing financial support at the national, regional and international levels for the successful implementation of a Global Strategic Plan to improve public health preparedness.	The Advisory Group did not speak on this area.
	Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola	WHO should convene Governments and other major stakeholders within six months to begin developing a global strategy to ensure domestic government investment in building core capacities and to mobilize adequate external support to supplement efforts in poorer countries. A transparent central system for tracking and monitoring the resource flow results is required.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	The World Bank, bilateral and other multilateral donors should declare that funding related to health system strengthening will be conditional upon a country's participation in the external assessment process.	
Ensure smooth WHO coordination and collaboration with partners as part of the wider health and humanitarian systems	Ebola Interim Assessment Panel	WHO does not need to build up a comprehensive emergency capacity, separate from that of other United Nations agencies. The overarching goal of WHO should be to coordinate in health emergencies, with, where possible, national Governments fulfilling their responsibilities and WHO not seeking to duplicate or replace other partner agencies' capacities.	Document EB138/55, paras. 5, 6, 8 and 17; Global Policy Group Statement, para. 4; Progress Report, para. 2; and document A69/30, paras. 9 and 10 The Independent Panel did not speak on this area.
	Advisory Group on Reform of WHO's Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies	*First report*: WHO must exercise decisive leadership on the health aspects of an outbreak or emergency, while supporting national authorities and operating as one partner with other actors, each of whom have their own responsibilities and expertise. The Programme's operational capacity should interface and be interoperable with similar governmental and partner capacities. WHO should establish partnership agreements with partners and put in place a framework for cooperation that can be activated under defined circumstances, clarifying respective roles and responsibilities.	

Major area	*Panel*	*Specific recommendation*	*WHO response*
		Second report: As an operational organization, WHO will need to engage quickly and openly with other health actors. This means recognizing that WHO will not be the default actor — in most instances, the national Government will be the principal actor, supplemented by national and international partners. The principal operational role of WHO will be to work with others to ensure that critical requirements are met and gaps are filled, with WHO implementing when appropriate.	
	High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises	The Centre should develop partnerships with logistics providers to be able to support the rapid deployment of responders and crucially needed materials. Where a health crisis is the cause of a humanitarian emergency, the Centre should coordinate an inclusive inter-agency response.	
	IHR Review Committee	WHO capacity and partnerships to implement IHR and to respond to health emergencies should be strengthened. The WHO emergency response structure should have strong linkages to both internal and external partners. WHO should develop agreements relevant to IHR implementation, when not already in place, with key United Nations agencies and other international bodies. WHO should develop or strengthen its links with key United Nations agencies in IASC.	
	Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future	By the end of 2016, WHO and Governments should enhance the means of cooperation with non-State actors, including local and international civil society organizations, the private sector and the media.	

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to table)

[a] For the report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, see http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/report-by-panel.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 2 May 2016).

[b] "2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak and issues raised: follow-up to the Special Session of the Executive Board on the Ebola Emergency (resolution EBSS3/R1) and the Sixty-eighth World Health Assembly (decision WHA68(10)): high-level design for a new WHO health emergencies programme" (EB138/55). Available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB138/B138_55-en.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016).

[c] "Global Policy Group Statement on reforms of WHO work in outbreaks and emergencies", Geneva, 30 January 2016. Available at http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2016/reform-statement/en/ (accessed 2 May 2016).

[d] "Progress report on the development of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme, 30 March 2016". Available at http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/who-health-emergencies-programme-progress-report-march-2016.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 2 May 2016).

[e] "Reform of WHO's work in health emergency management: WHO Health Emergencies Programme" (A69/30). Available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/A69_30-en.pdf (accessed 4 May 2016).

[f] For the Advisory Group's terms of reference, membership and reports, see http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/emergency-capacities/advisory-group/en/ (accessed 2 May 2016).

[g] See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/723 (accessed 11 April 2016).

[h] See http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/A69_21-en.pdf (accessed 16 May 2016).

[i] Suerie Moon and others, "Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic: report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola", *Lancet*, vol. 386, No. 10009 (28 November 2015), pp. 2204-2221. Available at www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736%2815%2900946-0.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016).

[j] Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future, "The Neglected Dimension of Global Security: A Framework to Counter Infectious Disease Crises", 2016. Available at https://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Neglected-Dimension-of-Global-Security.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016).

[k] "2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak and issues raised: follow-up to the Special Session of the Executive Board on the Ebola Emergency (resolution EBSS3/R1) and the Sixty-eighth World Health Assembly (decision WHA68(10)): update on 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak and Secretariat response to other issues raised" (EB138/27). Available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB138/B138_27-en.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016).

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Seventy-first year

Letter dated 2 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 1 November 2016 addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

16-19338 (E) 101116

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Annex to the letter dated 2 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 19 October 2016 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/71/556-S/2016/874), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding an "illegally issued notice to airmen", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus as "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly states, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the

effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2015 alone, the number of passengers that used Ercan Airport stood at nearly 3,500,000 (compared with 3,250,000 in 2014), and a 7 per cent increase in that number is expected in 2016. Moreover, in 2015, nearly 26,000 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure, and around 210,000 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace, a total which is expected to increase by 7 per cent in 2016. In that respect, it must be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are progressing swiftly in a results-oriented atmosphere, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/71/603–S/2016/934

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Security Council

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 26 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of September 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-19558 (E) 111116 151116

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Annex to the identical letters dated 26 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Ground violations committed in September 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 September	0700 1700	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August 2016 outside the technical fence in the locality of Saddanah, near observation point OP3 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using two excavators, four jackhammer vehicles and a bulldozer escorted by six AIL Storm vehicles and one Hummer vehicle. The Israeli enemy subsequently finished work and the vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.
5 September	0627 1645	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August 2016 outside the technical fence in the locality of Saddanah, near observation point OP3 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using four jackhammer vehicles, three excavators and two bulldozers escorted by two AIL Storm vehicles, six soldiers and a personnel carrier. The Israeli enemy subsequently finished its work and the vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.
6 September	0620	The sound of several explosions was heard in the Shab'a Farms.
	0626 1620	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August 2016 outside the technical fence in the locality of Saddanah, near observation point OP3 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, towards Birkat al-Naqqar. The enemy carried out the work using four jackhammer vehicles, two excavators and a bulldozer escorted by an AIL Storm vehicle and six soldiers. The Israeli enemy subsequently finished its work and the vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1615	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, four Israeli enemy soldiers installed a surveillance camera on a transmission tower within their position opposite Ra's Naqurah and pointed it towards Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy army finished work at 1725 hours and withdrew in the direction of occupied territory.
8 September	1200	A shepherd reported seeing a suspicious item on the outskirts of Shab'a town, near observation point OP1 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL. A Lebanese Army patrol went to the location and found some metal pegs planted in the ground. The pegs were part of a surveillance device which the Israeli enemy had previously planted on Lebanese territory and has recently removed.
13 September	0530 0830	Several explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms. From its positions at Ramta and Summaqah, the Israeli enemy directed machine-gun and medium-weapons fire at the surroundings.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
19 September	1700	The Israeli enemy installed a camera opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal in the Kurum al-Shiraqi area, between points B64 and B64-1, 10 metres south of the Blue Line. The camera was fixed to a cube that was camouflaged to look like a rock. It was directed towards Lebanese territory.
26 September	1230	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August in the occupied Shab'a Farms, beyond the technical fence, at the locations of Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahl, in the direction of the Radar position. The enemy carried out the work using two D9 bulldozers escorted by a hostile patrol comprising two personnel carriers, two Merkava tanks and 25 soldiers who took up positions on the surrounding hills. The Israeli enemy finished work at 1630 hours.
27 September	0930	The Israeli enemy continued the work begun on 15 August in the occupied Shab'a Farms, beyond the technical fence, in the locations of Saddanah and Jabal al-Shahl, in the direction of the Radar position. The enemy carried out the work using two trench diggers escorted by a patrol comprising a Merkava tank and 15 soldiers who took up positions on the surrounding hills. The Israeli enemy finished work and the vehicles withdrew in the direction of occupied territory at 1630 hours.
29 September	1350	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Defender vehicle, a Hummer pick-up truck, a steamroller, a trench digger and three soldiers carried out maintenance work along the technical fence opposite the Lebanese Army checkpoint of Udaysah. Members of the patrol trained their weapons on Lebanese territory. The Israeli enemy finished work and withdrew in the direction of occupied territory at 1530 hours.

Sea violations committed in September 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 September	1716	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 September	1813	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 September	0938	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a 42-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. Enemy divers descended from the launch and carried out maintenance work on the second and third buoys. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1055 hours, it again violated the boundary, for an 18-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 300 metres. It then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1825	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1920	An Israeli enemy launch inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters released an explosive charge into occupied Palestinian territorial waters. The crew used a loudspeaker to call out in Hebrew to the crew of a Lebanese fishing vessel that was located inside Lebanese territorial waters.
6 September	0344	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for an eight-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 330 metres. The crew directed a searchlight at Lebanese territorial waters and used a loudspeaker to call out in Hebrew to the crew of a Lebanese fishing vessel that was located inside Lebanese territorial waters.
	0400 0430	From its position in occupied Palestinian territory opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy twice directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters, first for 30 seconds and then for 40 seconds.
	1748	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
10 September	1905	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
11 September	0230	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of five minutes.
	1824	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 130 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 September	0457	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 425 metres. The crew launched an explosive device into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1822	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1831 hours, it violated the boundary again, for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. It then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
14 September	1010	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-hour-and-50-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1805	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 September	1006	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for an eight-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 110 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1034 hours, it again violated the boundary, for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. It then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1855	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 204 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 September	1810	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
17 September	0847	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 110 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1855	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 September	1738	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1818 hours, it again violated the boundary, for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for 185 metres. It then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in September 2016

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 September	0445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0630 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2260 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
5 September	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1900 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
6 September	0515	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1555 hours over Kafr Killa.
7 September	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1145 hours over Rumaysh.
	1300	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1440 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
8 September	1220	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1430 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1350	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1555 hours over Kafr Killa.
10 September	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2115 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
11 September	1010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1018	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Juniyah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
12 September	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1300 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1725 hours over Rumaysh.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Kafr Killa.
13 September	1040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Rumaysh.
14 September	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2250	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0800 hours over Naqurah.
15 September	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2340 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1140 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
16 September	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1835 hours over Naqurah.
18 September	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1715 hours over the Shab'a Farms.
19 September	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2230 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1225 hours over Aytarun.
21 September	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2015 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
22 September	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 2215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
24 September	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1900 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 0055 hours on 25 September over Alma al-Sha'b.
25 September	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
26 September	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
27 September	1040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2000 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1615	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1710 hours over Rumaysh.
	1655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Jubayl, Kasrawan and Matn before leaving at 2215 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2359	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0645 hours on 28 September over Kafr Killa.
28 September	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1535 hours over Rumaysh.
	1625	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1750 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
29 September	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2215 hours over Kafr Killa.
30 September	1350	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

16-19558

United Nations A/71/604

General Assembly

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7 November 2016

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 112 (b)
Elections to fill vacancies in principal organs: election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council

Letter dated 4 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat

In my capacity as Chair of the Western European and other States Group for the month of November 2016, I have the honour to inform you that, on the basis of the Group's rotation scheme for the Economic and Social Council, and following the note verbale sent by the Permanent Mission of Malta on 29 April 2016, with reference to the Group's by-election (Greece will relinquish its seat to Turkey and Portugal will relinquish its seat to Spain), the Western European and other States Group has endorsed the candidatures of Spain and Turkey.

(*Signed*) Damiano **Beleffi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-19405 (E) 081116

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United Nations A/71/605–S/2016/925

General Assembly
Security Council

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10 November 2016
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Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 69 (a) and 108

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 1 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to draw your attention to the following:

Armed terrorist groups active in the city of Aleppo fired a large number of rockets and mortar shells at neighbourhoods in western Aleppo. Their targets included the United Nations headquarters located in the Shahba Hotel, which was hit on the western side that faces Bustan al-Qasr, a neighbourhood controlled by terrorist groups. That reprehensible terrorist attack led the acting United Nations Resident Coordinator in the Syrian Arab Republic to evacuate that office's staff from Aleppo.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic condemns that terrorist attack, which was carried out by the Nur al-Din al-Zanki terrorist organization and other terrorist entities affiliated with the Nusrah Front and Al-Qaida terrorist organizations. It calls on the United Nations and the Security Council to condemn that attack and to compel the Governments of States that support terrorist groups to cease their violations of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, put an end to the crimes of their affiliated terrorist groups, and fully implement the relevant United Nations and Security Council counter-terrorism resolutions, in particular resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2016), as well as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism

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Strategy and the resolution adopted at the conclusion of the fifth Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its commitment to the security and safety of international and local humanitarian workers. It believes that the decision to evacuate United Nations staff from Aleppo at this critical juncture was inappropriate and constitutes an abdication by the Secretariat of its responsibilities and obligations under the Charter. The Syrian Government deplores the failure of senior United Nations officials to condemn crimes and attacks by armed terrorist groups, even those committed against the Organization's own headquarters, especially when the Secretariat seems ready to unleash a torrent of statements, accusation and criticisms whenever trumped up charges are levelled against the Syrian Government.

The Syrian Government calls on the Secretariat to ensure full adherence to the principle of "stay and deliver" as affirmed by General Assembly resolutions adopted under the agenda items entitled "Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations" and "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel", and to continue its work in the city of Aleppo under existing coordination arrangements in full cooperation with the Syrian Government.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its commitment to working with national partners and United Nations agencies to meet the needs of the Syrian people, including the inhabitants of the city of Aleppo.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 69 (a) and 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/71/606–S/2016/893

General Assembly
Security Council

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8 November 2016
English
Original: French

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 21 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

As part of the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a note dated 18 October 2016 on the establishment of the administrative authorities responsible for the communes, cercles and regions of northern Mali during the interim period (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Issa **Konfourou**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-19579 (E) 161116 161116

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Annex to the identical letters dated 21 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Note on the establishment of the interim authorities

I. Introduction

The Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process provides for the establishment of governing authorities for the communes, cercles and regions of northern Mali during the interim period.

Accordingly, such interim authorities are established under Act No. 2016-013 of 10 May 2016 amending the Territorial Units Code. The Act was promulgated by the President following a constitutional review. Its implementation is covered under the provisions of Decree No. 2016-0332/P-RM of 18 May 2016 and those of the Entente on the interim authorities and other related arrangements, signed on 19 June 2016 among the Malian signatories to the Agreement.

The above provisions set out in detail the practical arrangements for establishing interim authorities, redeploying deconcentrated State services and appointing the heads of administrative divisions and of the operational coordination mechanism in the Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni and Ménaka regions during the established interim period, namely 18 to 24 months from the date of signature of the Agreement.

II. Interim period

Under annex 1 of the Agreement, the goals of the interim period are to:

- Ensure the adoption of any regulatory, legislative and constitutional texts necessary for the establishment and operation of the new framework for the country's institutional, political and security systems, its economic, social and cultural development, and its justice and national reconciliation processes;
- Revise the electoral law to ensure that elections are held at the local, regional and national levels during the interim period so that the bodies provided for in the Agreement may be established;
- Implement measures and arrangements for the restoration of peace, cessation of hostilities and reform of the reconstituted defence and security forces in order to enhance their professionalism and their commitment to civilian control;
- Ensure the adoption of agreed measures with a view to addressing the challenge of terrorism and extremism and preventing any resurgence of sectarianism, marginalization or impunity;
- Implement the Agreement in accordance with the implementation timeline.

III. Interim authorities

The five-year terms of the councils elected in the territorial units in 2009, which came to an end in 2014, were extended:

- For a period of six months as from 27 April 2014 by Decree No. 2014-0197/P-RM of 18 March 2014;
- For a period of six months as from 27 October 2014 by Decree No. 2014-0810/P-RM of 23 October 2014;
- For a period of six months as from 27 April 2015 by Act No. 2015-010 of 24 April 2015.

Given the numerous challenges inherent in organizing nationwide elections on the same day for the appointment of new council members, Act No. 2015-047 of 7 December 2015 extended, on an exceptional basis, the terms of office of the commune councils, the cercle councils, the regional councils and the Bamako District council from 27 October 2015 until the inauguration of the new councils of the territorial units.

However, Act No. 2015-047 did not address the specific case of the councils that exist or are to be established in the northern regions in Taoudenni and Ménaka as provided under the Agreement.

Thus, in order to ensure that all the councils of Mali's territorial units are covered legally by the same rules in exceptional circumstances such as dissolution, collective resignation of members, cancellation of elections or cases of force majeure, the term "*autorités transitoires*" (transitional authorities) is used in the present draft.

This term is more flexible than the term "*délégations spéciales*" (interim managing committees) and covers, where the northern territorial units of the country are concerned, those officials entrusted with local government during the 18- to 24-month interim period established by the Agreement.

A commune, cercle or regional council shall be deemed to be not functioning if, for a period of at least 12 consecutive months, it fails to:

- Provide public services;
- Hold two regular meetings.

Therefore, under the provisions of the Entente of 19 June 2016:

(a) Interim authorities shall be established in the territorial units of the five northern regions of Mali: Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni and Ménaka;

(b) All members of an interim authority shall be eligible for membership of the council it replaces in the territorial unit concerned;

(c) In the regions, the interim authority shall have as many members as the regional council it replaces. The members of the interim regional authority shall be appointed by consensus by the Government, the Platform and the Coordination from among the staff of deconcentrated State services, civil society and the outgoing

council members. The interim regional authority shall appoint from among its members a president and two vice-presidents;

(d) In the cercles, the interim authority shall have as many members as the cercle council it replaces. The members of the interim cercle authority shall be appointed by consensus by the Government, the Platform and the Coordination from among the staff of deconcentrated State services, civil society and the outgoing council members. The interim cercle authority shall appoint from among its members a president and two vice-presidents;

(e) In the communes, the interim authority shall have as many members as the commune council it replaces. In the interest of standardizing the status and powers of the relevant territorial units, interim authorities shall be appointed in all the communes of the Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni and Ménaka regions. The entire membership of the decision-making body of the commune shall automatically be established as the interim authority. Where the parties determine that a particular commune council is not functioning, the Government, the Platform and the Coordination shall appoint by consensus the members of the interim authority of the relevant commune. The interim commune authority shall appoint from among its members a president and two vice-presidents.

IV. Duties and responsibilities of the interim authorities

The president of each interim authority shall be the head of the local executive.

Accordingly, the deconcentrated State technical services responsible for the following areas shall be under his authority:

- Preschool, primary, secondary, technical and vocational education;
- Community health centres, health-care referral centres and hospitals;
- Rural and urban water supply;
- Industry and trade, crafts, transport, tourism;
- Environment;
- Agriculture;
- Social development;
- Protection and advancement of women, children and the family;
- Animal husbandry and fisheries.

The duties of the interim authorities shall include the following:

- Restore and ensure the functioning of basic social services;
- Plan and coordinate the implementation of development and economic, social and cultural recovery initiatives;
- Be part of the process of updating the voter register;

- Be part of the process of consultation and dialogue with the local populations about the proposed territorial redistricting of the five northern regions;
- Participate in the preparation and holding of elections and referendums;
- Facilitate and prepare for the return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons and provide recovery aid to people affected by disasters;
- Support the implementation of the operational coordination mechanism;
- Monitor and manage land issues.

V. Representatives of the Platform and the Coordination to the State representative in the administrative divisions

The Platform and the Coordination shall each designate special advisers as follows:

- Two to the State representative in the region;
- One each to the State representative in the cercle and arrondissement.

The special advisers shall be appointed by the Government for the duration of the interim period.

They shall be involved in the following tasks:

- Managing security and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration issues in concert with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission;
- Providing support to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission;
- Preparing and holding elections;
- Dealing with any issue of relevance to the implementation of the Agreement.

The salaries and benefits of the special advisers shall be covered by the State budget.

The special advisers to the State representative at the regional level shall have the same salaries and benefits as the chef de cabinet of the governor of the region.

The special advisers to the State representative at the cercle level shall have the same salaries and benefits as the deputy prefect.

The special advisers to the State representative at the arrondissement level shall have the same salaries and benefits as the secretary-general of the sub-prefect.

VI. The State representative in the administrative divisions

The representative of the State shall safeguard the public interest. He shall transmit government policy on major projects and facilitate economic and social development and land management policies.

The decisions of the interim authorities shall be enforceable upon their issuance and transmission to the State representative.

The State representative shall review the administrative decisions of the territorial units as to their lawfulness.

At the regional level, the State representative shall have authority over:

- The heads of districts, cercles and arrondissements;
- The army and security forces;
- The treasury, budget, tax, customs, financial oversight, and government procurement and outsourcing services.

VII. Financial resources of the interim authorities

The interim authorities shall be provided with special appropriations in the form of subsidies, grants and gifts to carry out their duties.

To that end, the Government, the Platform and the Coordination shall hold a joint meeting with the technical and financial partners after the signing of the Entente.

In the Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni and Ménaka regions, the interim authorities shall also be provided with funding from the national support fund for territorial units for 2016.

The president of each interim authority shall control the expenditures of the relevant territorial unit.

The government accountant of the territorial unit shall be the relevant Treasury officer.

A government financial oversight officer shall be assigned to each territorial unit.

VIII. Other provisions

Special provision

In the event of a threat to law and order, the State representative and the president of the interim authority shall jointly take appropriate police action to restore law and order.

Justice system

Justice shall be rendered by the courts and justices of the peace with extended jurisdiction.

Pending the revision of the 1992 Constitution and the review of subsequent legislation, the customary and religious authorities shall conduct civil mediation.

Transitional measures

Pending the promulgation of the act establishing new territorial units, there shall be established, on an exceptional basis, transitional panels in the newly created administrative divisions.

The transitional panels shall provisionally perform the duties of the future interim authorities.

At the regional level, each transitional panel shall have 15 members selected from civil society. They shall elect from among their members a chairperson and two vice-chairpersons.

At the cercle level, each transitional panel shall have 11 members selected from civil society. They shall elect from among their members a chairperson and two vice-chairpersons.

At the arrondissement level, each transitional panel shall have 7 members selected from civil society. They shall elect from among their members a chairperson and two vice-chairpersons.

The members of the transitional panels shall be appointed by consensus by the Government, the Platform and the Coordination.

Final provisions

The mandates of all the interim authorities shall automatically expire upon the reconstitution and inauguration of the councils of the relevant territorial units by means of elections, as provided under articles 97 and 98 of the Constitution.

United Nations A/71/607–S/2016/944

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 19, 32 and 37

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Sustainable development

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 8 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/4 of 5 November 2001, which the Republic of Azerbaijan joined as one of the co-sponsors, the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict is commemorated on 6 November of every year. In that resolution, the General Assembly noted that damage to the environment in times of armed conflict impairs ecosystems and natural resources long beyond the period of conflict, and recalled in particular Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which all Member States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any State in their international relations.

Earlier, in 1992, in its resolution 47/37, entitled "Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict", the General Assembly urged States to take all measures to ensure compliance with the existing international laws applicable to the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development paid particular attention to the need for urgent action to protect the environment. In May 2016, the United Nations Environment Assembly adopted a resolution on the protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflict, reaffirming, inter alia, its strong commitment to the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda and stressing the importance of the implementation by all Member States of international law applicable to the protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflict in line with their legal responsibilities.

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The aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan, which has led to the seizure of almost 20 per cent of the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan, claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, ruined cities and livelihoods and resulted in the forcible expulsion of more than 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and properties, has also had a devastating impact on the environment, with destroyed forests, burned and degraded soil, polluted water resources and killed animals.

The total area of special environmental protection in Azerbaijan covers 890,000 hectares of land, of which 42,997 hectares are currently under Armenian military occupation, including 152 natural monuments, 5 geological objects, 2 nature reserves, 4 conservation areas and 7 lakes, with a wide range of plant and animal species. In addition 247,352 hectares of forests remain under occupation, including 13,197 hectares of valuable forests, with hundreds of rare species of trees, such as plane trees, nut trees, oak trees, box tree evergreens, Eldar pine trees, persimmon trees and others.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the armed forces of Armenia have deliberately employed methods and means of warfare to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment of Azerbaijan, including its occupied territories.

Thus, in 2006, some areas in the occupied territories along the front line between the armed forces of Azerbaijan and the armed forces of Armenia were subjected to wide-scale fires.[1] In its resolution 60/285 of 7 September 2006, entitled "The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan", the General Assembly expressed serious concern about the fires in the occupied territories and stressed the necessity to urgently conduct an environmental operation to suppress the fires and to overcome their detrimental consequences. In accordance with that resolution, between 2 and 13 October, the occupied territories of Azerbaijan were visited by an environmental assessment mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In its report, the mission concluded, inter alia, that the fires had resulted in environmental and economic damages and had threatened human health and security.[2]

The continuing occupation by Armenia of the territories of Azerbaijan also deprives hundreds of thousands of citizens of Azerbaijan of drinking water, causes soil erosion, dehydration and desertification and severely affects the region's natural resources and flora and fauna.

In its resolution 2085 (2016), adopted on 26 January 2016, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe described Armenia's actions as environmental aggression aimed at creating humanitarian and environmental problems for the citizens of Azerbaijan. The Assembly warned of the serious threat of disaster and humanitarian crisis that the state of disrepair of the Sarsang dam posed to the whole

[1] See the letter dated 28 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the letter dated 28 July 2006 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (A/60/963).

[2] See the letter dated 20 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the report to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office from the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (A/61/696).

area. In view of that urgent humanitarian problem, the Assembly demanded from Armenia its immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and the cessation of using water resources as tools of political influence or an instrument of pressure benefiting it.[3]

The environment is being severely damaged also as a result of the continuing barbaric exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Such exploitation has generated significant profit for Armenia and the subordinate separatist regime it has set up in those territories to accrue personal fortunes and fund a war. The relentless exploitation of farmlands in the occupied territories for many years has led to their depletion.[4]

There is evidence of deliberate transboundary pollution of rivers from tailings originating in Armenia, crossing the international border of Azerbaijan and ending up in its farmlands and forests. Thus, waters of the rivers in the Syunik district of Armenia, polluted with wastes from the Kapan Ore Processing Plant, the Zangezour Copper and Molybdenum Combine and the "Artsvanik" tailing dump, flow into the transboundary Okhchuchay river and then into the occupied Zangilan district of Azerbaijan and the Araz river.

The timber trade has become one of the sources of revenue for Armenia. In 1993 alone, some 206,600 cubic metres of valuable types of timber from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan were transported to Armenia. In 1996, 55 hectares of walnut trees of the Leshkar forest area in the occupied Zangilan district of Azerbaijan, planted in 1957 and 1958, were cut down. In 2003, some 10,000 walnut trees were cut down in the occupied territories. Some 45,359 cubic metres of timber was cut in 2010 and 96,237 cubic metres in 2013. The evidence confirms that illegal timber-cutting in the occupied territories is on the rise.

Owing to its continuing aggression against Azerbaijan, Armenia bears full international responsibility for the breaches of international law, including those that have caused damage to the environment of Azerbaijan and the depletion of natural resources in its occupied territories. This once again confirms the need for urgent and effective action to invoke Armenia's responsibility through consistent efforts by the international community, thus bringing to an end the impunity enjoyed by the aggressors and ensuring the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan from the Armenian occupation.

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[3] The Sarsang reservoir is the largest water reservoir in the area. It was formed in 1976 when a dam was built on the Tartar river in the Aghdere district of Azerbaijan to supply drinking water to more than 500,000 people in the areas of upper and lower Karabakh in Azerbaijan and irrigation water to more than 100,000 hectares of fertile land in the six districts of the republic. It has been under Armenian occupation since 1993. The current technical condition of the Sarsang dam poses a serious threat to approximately 400,000 citizens of Azerbaijan living downstream from it. For more information, see the report of the Rapporteur of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Milica Marković, entitled "Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived of water" (Document 13931, 12 December 2015).

[4] For more information, see the letter dated 15 August 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the report on illegal economic and other activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (A/70/1016-S/2016/711).

There can be no durable peace if the environment that sustains livelihoods is destroyed, polluted and barbarically exploited. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated on 6 November 2016 in his message on the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict, to achieve the goals declared in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is a transformational blueprint for peace, prosperity and dignity for all on a healthy planet, we have a duty of care towards the environment in peacetime and during war and have to work together to combat environmental crime and end the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 19, 32 and 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/71/608

General Assembly

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8 October 2016

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 19 (d)
Sustainable development: protection of global climate for present and future generations of humankind

Update on progress towards the development of an action plan for integrating sustainable development practices into Secretariat-wide operations and facilities management

Note by the Secretariat

Summary

In response to the request of the General Assembly, in paragraph 14 of its resolution 70/205, the present note provides an update on progress made towards the development of the requested action plan for the Secretariat aimed at integrating sustainable development practices into its operations and facilities management. The note summarizes the scope, structure, roles and responsibilities necessary for the implementation of the plan.

The Secretary-General will develop, as soon as possible, or by 2020, if practicable, the action plan for the Secretariat, in the form of an environmental management system, including a schedule of required activities and milestones, so that the Secretariat does not, through its operations or facilities management, have a negative impact on the climate.

16-19584 (E) 111116

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I. Introduction

1. On 22 June 2012, in the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, entitled "The future we want", Heads of State and Government and high-level representatives called upon the United Nations system to improve the management of facilities and operations by taking into account sustainable development practices, building on existing efforts and promoting cost effectiveness, and in accordance with legislative frameworks, including financial rules and regulations, while maintaining accountability to Member States.[1]

2. That call was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/288 and reiterated in paragraph 15 of its resolution 67/226 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system.

3. On 22 December 2015, the General Assembly adopted resolution 70/205, in paragraph 14 of which it requested the Secretary-General, as a follow-up to paragraph 96 of the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, to submit an action plan as soon as possible, or by 2020, if practicable, for the Secretariat that would be designed to work within existing procurement rules and policies aimed at integrating sustainable development practices into its operations and facilities management, building on existing efforts and promoting cost effectiveness, and in accordance with legislative frameworks, including financial rules and regulations, while maintaining accountability to Member States, with the specific goal of a United Nations that does not, through its operations or facilities management, have a negative impact on the climate.

II. Sustainable Development Goals and sustainability management

4. On 25 September 2015, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 70/1, entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", in which it agreed on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 related targets. In that resolution, the Assembly also made a commitment to making fundamental changes in the way that our societies produce and consume goods and services and stated that Governments, international organizations, the business sector and other non-State actors and individuals must contribute to changing unsustainable consumption and production patterns.

5. On 4 November 2016, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in which the parties to the Convention resolved to keep global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, entered into force. This goal is in line with Sustainable Development Goal 13.

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[1] *Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20-22 June 2012* (A/CONF.216/16), chap. I, resolution 1, annex, para. 96.

6. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 70/205, the United Nations is expected to contribute to these goals by integrating sustainable development practices into its own management practices.

7. The Environment Management Group, a United Nations system-wide coordination body on environment chaired by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), has been working on these issues since 2008 and has established a working group on environmental sustainability management at the United Nations. Following the decisions of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on the implementation of a United Nations climate neutral strategy (2007), the introduction of environmental management systems (2013) and a United Nations road map towards climate neutrality by 2020 (2015),[2] the Environment Management Group is responsible for facilitating the implementation of the climate neutral strategy and assisting the efforts of the organizations of the United Nations system to reduce the environmental impacts of their facilities and operations through the implementation of organization-specific environmental management systems.

8. In December 2011, a senior level steering group on environmental sustainability management was established for United Nations Headquarters in New York. In addition to directing the future development of the action plan, the steering group has guided a number of initiatives that have been undertaken at Headquarters, including: the sourcing of renewable electrical energy; a management strategy for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; the replacement of individual printers with centrally managed shared printers to reduce energy, toner and paper use; and an internal communications campaign to raise awareness of environmental issues in the workplace.

9. An environmental management system uses a structured approach designed to help organizations to manage their environmental impacts and improve their environmental performance over time and within a scope defined by the organizations themselves. An environmental management system provides a structure for the integration of environmental considerations into key management areas such as training, records management, inspections and the establishment of objectives and policies.

III. Purpose

10. In line with General Assembly resolutions 66/288 (para. 96), 67/226 (para. 15) and 70/205 (para. 14), the action plan for the Secretariat would, through the implementation of an environmental management system, aim at integrating sustainable development practices into its operations and facilities management. It would build on existing efforts and promote cost effectiveness while maintaining accountability to Member States. In addition, the action plan would allow the Secretariat to internalize the management of its facilities and operations and contribute to different Sustainable Development Goals and targets, including the goal of taking urgent action to combat climate change, and any negative impact on

[2] CEB/2007/2, CEB/2013/1 and CEB/2015/1.

climate from the Secretariat's operations and facilities management, and the goal of ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns.[1]

IV. Scope

11. The Secretariat's action plan would apply to all operations and facilities management procedures, decisions, activities and practices of the Secretariat at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, the regional commissions and field operations and missions.

V. Implementation structure and governance

12. The Secretariat operates in countries with a great variety of infrastructures, markets and local cultures, and what can be done to reduce the environmental and climate impact of its operations varies from location to location.

13. The Secretary-General intends to revise the terms of reference of the existing senior level steering group on environmental sustainability management and to adjust the membership to incorporate Secretariat-wide representation in order to provide an overarching Secretariat-wide environmental management system coordination mechanism. This coordination mechanism will provide a framework for the sharing and leveraging of existing positive experiences and practices in the field of environmental management while improving coordination and internal communications, with the goal of a continuous improvement in resource use.

14. The central support to locations would be based on the guidance provided by the above-mentioned senior level steering group on environmental sustainability management at the United Nations.

15. The action plan would entail a harmonized but decentralized approach to the reduction of the United Nations environmental footprint, intended to allow each geographic location of the Secretariat to determine the most relevant environmental impacts of their activities, propose planned actions to address these impacts and periodically verify their effectiveness.

16. Such a systematic approach would help the Secretariat — in all of its locations — to prioritize management of the most significant environmental risks where they occur and to support the implementation of locally viable measures first.

17. Each geographic location of the United Nations Secretariat, including each special political and peacekeeping mission, would be expected to progressively integrate environmental sustainability practices into its operations and facilities management. United Nations field missions have already started doing so, following the approval of the 2009 environmental policy for field missions. The General Assembly, in its resolution 70/286 (para. 31), requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to reduce the overall environmental footprint of each

[1] The full implementation of an environmental management system by the Secretariat could positively contribute, inter alia, to Sustainable Development Goal targets and indicators 3.9, 4.7, 6.1-6.4, 7.2, 7.3, 9.4, 9.a, 11.2, 11.4, 11.7, 11.b, 12.2-12.8, 13.2, 13.3, 15.1, 15.5, 15.7, 15.8, 17.18 and 17.19.

peacekeeping mission, including by implementing environmentally friendly waste management and power generation systems, in full compliance with the relevant rules and regulations, including, but not limited to, the United Nations environmental and waste management policy and procedures. The Security Council has also addressed this issue through a number of mandates in recent years.[4] The Department of Field Support is therefore already working on an environment strategy, including the integration of an environmental management system into its operations.

18. The core objectives of each environmental management system would be: to analyse, plan and periodically review the environmental aspects of operations and facilities management; to select environmental objectives related to those aspects; and to implement strategies for achieving them. The system would be integrated into existing management processes and be designed to respect existing rules and regulations.[5]

19. The Secretariat would capitalize on existing efforts in facilities and operations to use resources more efficiently and integrate them into the environmental management systems in order to provide a more complete context. The systems would also be designed to facilitate synergies and joint initiatives for meeting environmental objectives common to one or more geographic locations.

20. The action plan would be designed to develop a Secretariat-wide environmental policy along with the implementation of environmental management systems at each geographic location.

A. Local technical teams

21. Except for United Nations field operations, which will be reporting directly to the Department of Field Support, each environmental management system would operate at the local level through the existing technical team responsible for facilities and operations under the direction of a senior management steering group at the relevant geographic location. Each senior management steering group would report to the Secretariat-wide environmental management system coordination mechanism, as would the Department of Field Support on behalf of the field operations and missions. The technical teams would undertake periodic assessments of the policies, procedures and activities at their respective geographic locations and analyse the related environmental impacts, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement and synergies.

B. Local senior level steering groups

22. The senior management steering groups would prioritize areas of focus for environmental improvement and decide on sustainability objectives that, in the local

[4] For the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, see Security Council resolutions 2100 (2013), 2164 (2014), 2227 (2015) and 2295 (2016); for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, see Security Council resolution 2245 (2015).

[5] Including financial regulation 5.12.

context, would lead to the overall goals defined by the General Assembly in its resolution 70/205.

23. The technical teams would implement specific activities that would lead to the achievement of the goals, track progress towards them and submit annual progress reports to the steering groups.

24. The reports of the environmental management systems from all geographic locations would be submitted to the Secretariat-wide environmental management system coordination mechanism. Using information from the annual reports, as well as from the periodic assessments of environmental impacts at their locations, each steering group would reassess its environmental management priorities and objectives. Processes for the continuous monitoring and improvement of the environmental management systems themselves, and of the overall coordination mechanism, would be an integral part of the local technical, local senior and Secretariat-wide programme of work.

VI. No negative impact on the climate by 2020

25. An initial goal of the environmental management systems across the Secretariat would be to avoid a negative impact on the climate, but they would also take other environmental objectives into account in terms of Secretariat operations and facilities management. This is understood to mean that all entities would undertake efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts as far as possible while meeting their business needs and delivering their mandates. The Secretariat is already tracking its greenhouse gas emissions, using a standard methodology across the entire United Nations system.

26. The action plan would consider employing traditional and innovative but proven approaches — in part, in whole or in combination — to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve other environmental objectives. Examples of such approaches would include: infrastructure enhancements that improve energy efficiency; increased use of renewable energy sources such as solar power; the use of fuel-efficient ground transport; and improved water and waste management practices.

VII. Reporting on achievements

27. As a result of the implementation of environmental management systems at all locations, the Secretariat would report on the improvements achieved through existing channels, including through reports of the Secretary-General mandated by the General Assembly that address the mainstreaming of the three dimensions of sustainable development throughout the United Nations system.

VIII. Conclusion

28. The Secretariat is committed to taking an active part in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and of the Sustainable Development

Goals by integrating sustainable development practices into its management of facilities and operations.

IX. Next steps

29. The Secretariat will establish a Secretariat-wide environmental management system coordination mechanism, including the establishment of senior management steering groups at each geographic location and environmental management systems at the various geographic locations of the United Nations Secretariat, as described in section V above.

30. On the basis of the work of the Secretariat-wide environmental management system coordination mechanism and of the environmental management systems at the various geographic locations, the Secretariat will develop, as soon as possible, or by 2020, if practicable, the action plan, including a schedule of required activities and milestones, so that it does not, through its operations or facilities management, have a negative impact on the climate.

United Nations A/71/609

General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 68 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Letter dated 21 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the comments and observations of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/71/374) (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68 (c).

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-19817 (E) 151116

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Annex to the letter dated 21 October 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Comments and observations of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

While the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations in carrying out its mandate and addressing main global issues are being questioned, the counterproductive approach embodied in the report of the Secretary-General (A/71/374) can only further erode the integrity and the relevance of the United Nations human rights mechanisms and make them even less credible. The report once again brings to light the unfortunate fact that the United Nations human rights mechanisms continue to be manipulated and politicized by applying selectivity, double standards and political manoeuvring as their modus operandi. Beyond political considerations, there is no credible ground for producing four similar reports annually on Iran. The duplication of false and biased allegations neither substantiates nor gives credibility to such reports, which are basically carbon copied. The intent, the structure and the approach of the report make it objectionable in its entirety.

It is instructive to notice that the report almost completely disregards the democratic and the dynamic environment that exists and constantly progresses in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As an indication of the Government's adherence to respect for and the promotion of human rights, during the past four decades genuine elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran have decided the country's direction in both internal and foreign affairs. In keeping with its commitment to the people's right to freely decide their destiny, on February 2016 the tenth parliamentary election was held in a free, democratic and competitive setting. As a result, the number of women parliamentarians has significantly increased in the new Parliament. Iranians will go to the ballot boxes once again in May 2017 for the twelfth Presidential election. Ballot boxes actually rule the country and have contributed to creating peaceful democratic processes and raised the level of transparency and accountability, as inherent characteristics of Iran's vibrant social and political life. Free and open media and social networks routinely contribute to the decision-making process throughout the political levels. It is worth noting that it was decided not to mention these developments in the report, as if democracy and ballot boxes are not important enough when it comes to human rights situations on certain occasions.

The peculiar interpretation of the Secretariat of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals constitutes a clear deviation from the Agenda and its Goals (see paragraph 79 of the report). Considering Agenda 2030 as a human rights commitment is absolutely inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the Agenda and the promises Member States have made therein. It is also surprising to notice that the Secretariat seems unaware of the principles governing United Nations country presence. Country offices in developing countries are not part of the United Nations human rights mechanism. Policy

documents such as the quadrennial comprehensive policy review clearly underline programme countries' leadership and ownership over their programmes with United Nations agencies. The new understanding provided in the report completely contradicts the will of Member States as reflected in the 2030 Agenda and the quadrennial comprehensive policy review.

Another odd innovation in the report was the insertion of a new section on refugees. A reference to the extensive and outstanding services provided to refugees by the Islamic Republic of Iran does not justify overstepping the specific mandate. While a few thousand refugees are viewed as a serious security threat by some countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has generously, and with negligible international support, hosted, with the highest possible standards, millions of regular and undocumented refugees for several decades. It is absolutely disgraceful that the United Nations, instead of raising support for the exemplary work delivered by Iran, further diluted the report with unsubstantiated irrelevant allegations or isolated cases concerning refugees.

A distinctive feature of the report is the overwhelming attempt to whitewash criminals, armed drug dealers, terrorists, rapists and spies, as well as their vicious conduct against ordinary Iranian citizens. A big chunk of the report is allocated to openly or tacitly defending those who do not recognize the rights of their victims. The persistent inclination in the report to disparage the Government's decisiveness and dedication in protecting people's safety and security is not at all constructive. It is unfortunate that the report went to the extent of labelling terrorists as political prisoners. The mandate does not qualify the authors to imbue the report with arbitrary judgments or preferences. Obviously, when it comes to the penal codes and other laws, Member States are required to act solely within the confines of national laws and international conventions.

Also striking is the expectation expressed in the report that the Government should avoid confronting immoral and pornographic content on the Internet, as breaking relevant national laws and regulations are embellished as artistic creativity in the report. In addition, there is concern expressed that the Government seeks to store data on Iranian users on Iranian servers and considers it a risk to their privacy, as if their privacy would be ensured and protected should Iranians' information be stored on foreign servers. Another strange pattern traceable throughout the report is the insistence on raising very isolated cases, which are unfortunate incidents that could happen everywhere on a daily basis. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that the authors were unaware of the available figures and relevant data on the recorded cases of honour killings and female genital mutilation in Iran, which are even less than those that have occurred in the heart of Europe.

As a country at the frontline of countering illicit drugs, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sustained huge life and property losses to protect its citizens and part of the global community from the evil of addiction. Thus far in the course of Iran's relentless campaign against regional and international armed drug traffickers, around 4,000 law enforcement officers have lost their lives and 12,000 have been maimed. On average, more than 80 per cent of the world's opium and approximately 40 per cent of the world's heroin and morphine are seized in Iran, so much that in 2015 alone approximately 620 tons of different types of drugs were seized in Iran. The support provided by the international community, however, has been minuscule.

Again, there was a preference to overlook this exceptional situation in the report and to side with the drug traffickers, who are typically armed and are linked with transnational organized crime and terrorist networks. There seems to be no expression of concern in the report about the young generation, whose lives are being utterly destroyed by these criminals, or the family members of the police officers, who are murdered by them. Owing to the severity of the crime and as a strong deterrent measure, capital punishment for the trafficking of large quantities of drugs, which usually involve live arms, is stipulated by the law. Nonetheless, to obtain an even higher degree of deterrence, discussions to properly revise the law are under way.

Iran is a country formed by minorities, ethnic and religious. Iran has been a refuge for minorities for thousands of years. Appreciation and recognition of minorities have been outstanding characteristics of the country's past; they are at present and they will be in the future. However, the insistence in the report to imply the existence of division and intolerance in the society is incomprehensible. The fabrication of non-existent situations can have arisen only from the unconstructive and biased approach taken by the authors of the report. Of course, since everyone is expected to be equal before the law, regardless of religion or ethnicity, belonging to a minority cannot and should not afford impunity to any violator.

Specific cases have been raised in the report that have been separately and extensively responded to in detail. However, the gravity of such cases is not greater than that of similar cases in most countries, such as to warrant country-specific reports or resolutions. No country can claim to be perfect; neither can the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is always room and the possibility to improve laws to the extent that they do not contradict social norms that are acceptable to citizens. Obviously, no country could or should be expected to abandon its laws just to curry favour with a few countries that wish to impose their way of living on others. As a matter of fact, the cornerstones of our laws and regulations are shared by almost all countries in our region and many more around the world. Therefore, their foundation and application are not limited to a single country or even region.

Should there be any genuine concern about human rights, the path of mutual respect and dialogue is the correct one to take. The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to the universal periodic review and cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Iran also expects to host very soon two thematic special rapporteurs, while extending its hands for dialogue and cooperation. In fact, as one of his first initiatives following his assumption of office, President Rouhani put forward the Charter of Citizens' Rights to enhance the promotion of human rights in the country, and appointed a woman as his special assistant to fast-track it. President Rouhani's policy of constructive engagement with the world promises new horizons for dialogue-based cooperation, understanding and mutual respect in all fields, including human rights. To enhance the credibility of human rights discourse, we seek respectful dialogue without recrimination or the blame game and welcome meaningful engagement with all serious partners. The report simply does not serve such purpose.

United Nations A/71/610

General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 114 (c)
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections: election of five members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission

Letter dated 8 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Having consulted with the top 10 troop-contributing countries, I have the honour to inform you that the following five Member States, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Rwanda, will represent the troop-contributing country category on the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission for the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2018.

I hope that this decision will facilitate the election of other Member States from the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission.

(*Signed*) Maleeha **Lodhi**
Permanent Representative

16-19917 (E) 151116

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United Nations A/71/611–S/2016/955

General Assembly
Security Council

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11 November 2016

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 41 and 73 (a)

Question of Cyprus

Oceans and the law of the sea

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 10 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I regret to bring to your attention the signing, on 10 October 2016, of a so-called framework "agreement" on cooperation regarding energy matters, between Turkey and its secessionist entity in the occupied part of Cyprus. This framework "agreement" provides for the establishment of an electricity connection between Turkey and the occupied areas of Cyprus through submarine cables and also envisages collaboration on a range of other issues, such as oil, natural gas and renewable energy.

While such an "agreement" remains legally invalid under international law, it constitutes yet another deliberate act of provocation by Turkey aimed at further consolidating its effective political and economic control over the occupied part of Cyprus, deepening the existing division and creating new faits accomplis on the ground.

In a letter dated 8 March 2016 addressed to you (A/70/780-S/2016/228), we expressed grave concern regarding the water connection between Turkey and the occupied part of Cyprus, which constitutes yet another illegal act in the context of Turkey's systematic policy of promoting the political and economic integration of the occupied part of Cyprus.

Beyond its grave political consequences, the serious legal and technical repercussions should also be highlighted. Turkey stands in violation of fundamental principles of international humanitarian law.[1] As the occupying Power, Turkey is in breach of its obligations under article 43 of the annex to the Fourth Hague

[1] The applicability of the rules of international humanitarian law to the Cypriot situation has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights: see *Varnava and Others v. Turkey* (Grand Chamber), 18 September 2009, paragraph 185.

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Convention of 1907, of the equivalent article of the Hague Convention of 1899 and of article 64 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to respect the laws of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is fully bound, under both conventional and customary international law, to fulfil the aforementioned obligations.

Furthermore, the laying of submarine cables in the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of Cyprus will constitute a further blatant violation of the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus. The signing of any such agreement lies outside the ambit of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Cyprus-related United Nations resolutions.

The signing of the aforementioned "agreement" occurred during an extremely critical phase of the negotiating process for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. While Turkey alleges that it supports the current negotiating process and wishes a speedy settlement of the Cyprus problem, it undertakes actions demonstrating its mistrust of the process and a deliberate effort to interfere with its outcome by creating new conditions to its own benefit.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has always showed its readiness to respond to requests for electricity supply to the population residing in the occupied part of Cyprus during occasions of shortage due to mechanical failures or high demand. Furthermore, it welcomed the decision to proceed with the synchronization of the electricity grids in Cyprus as a confidence-building measure. It can thus be safely assumed that this project's real aim is not to respond to any genuine need but, on the contrary, to cement the illegal division of the island and to strengthen the secessionist entity's economic and political subordination to Turkey.

At this stage, all parties involved, notably Turkey, should redouble their efforts towards the solution of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of Cyprus, thus creating the conditions for a holistic use of infrastructure for island-wide development and prosperity. Any actions that are not in compliance with this imperative need and international law not only complicate the negotiating process, but also undermine the much-needed trust between the two communities and the efforts to maintain a conducive climate at this very critical juncture.

Therefore, my Government kindly requests your assistance in conveying a strong message to Ankara to the effect that the Republic of Turkey must comply with international law, respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and refrain from creating new faits accomplis, which jeopardize the peace process and deepen the division of the island.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 41 and 73 (a), and of the Security Council, and have it published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in the next Law of the Sea Bulletin.

(*Signed*) Menelaos **Menelaou**
Chargé d' affaires a.i.

United Nations

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Agenda items 17 and 68

Macroeconomic policy questions

Promotion and protection of human rights

Letter dated 10 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Writing on behalf of the Member States of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and Republic of Tajikistan), I have the honour to transmit the attached statement of the Member States of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on inadmissibility of unilateral coercive measures, sanctions and blockades in intergovernmental relations (see annex).

I would appreciate it if you could kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 17, "Macroeconomic policy questions", and 68, "Human rights".

(Signed) Andrei **Dapkiunas**

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Annex to the letter dated 10 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the inadmissibility of unilateral coercive measures, sanctions and blockades in international relations

The States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,

Guided by the fundamental principles of international law and reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the development of cooperation, partnership and friendly relations among countries for peace and the development of good-neighbourly relations,

Declare the inadmissibility, except in accordance with Security Council resolutions, of the use of unilateral political, economic or any other coercive measures by one State, or a group of States, against another State.

We are deeply convinced that unilateral actions such as political isolation, blockades and economic, commercial and financial sanctions violate the principles of peace and good neighbourliness, undermine the legitimate rights and interests of States, impede free trade and lead to increased tension in international relations.

The use of coercive economic measures or the imposition of blockades against other States undermines the foundations of international and regional cooperation and integration.

We believe that cooperation among States should be conducted in accordance with international law and should be based on solidarity, transparency and equal partnership, without discrimination and with full respect for their mutual interests.

We note that the application of unilateral coercive measures, sanctions and blockades against any State affects not only the interests of that State as a whole, but also leads to the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

We strongly oppose the use of political or economic levers of pressure aimed at coercing third States into acceding to the initiatives of unilateral coercive measures, sanctions and blockades.

We are deeply convinced that further efforts to build a free, democratic world community, in accordance with the generally accepted purposes and principles of the United Nations, will not be possible in the context of sanctions, blockades and closed borders, with the exception of measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

We consider it inadmissible to violate the principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and to apply a selective approach to their implementation.

Convinced that the peaceful resolution of disputes is the best way to overcome disagreements among parties, the States members of the Collective Security Treaty

Organization call upon all countries to strictly abide by a spirit of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in forging inter-State relations and to reject the policy of blockades, isolation and economic pressure.

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 134
Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

Report on the use of the commitment authority and request for a subvention to the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction and background

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the use of the commitment authority and request for a subvention to the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (A/71/386 and Corr.1), in which a subvention of $2,980,500 is requested to enable the Court to continue to carry out its mandate in 2017. In the report, the Secretary-General also provides information on the use in 2016 of the commitment authority authorized by the General Assembly (see resolution 70/248 A of 23 December 2015, sect. VII) and on the current financial situation of the Residual Special Court and addresses options for future financing arrangements for the Court. During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 1 November 2016.

2. The report of the Secretary-General was prepared in response to General Assembly resolution 70/248 A, in which the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments, in an amount not to exceed $2,438,500, to supplement the voluntary financial resources of the Residual Court for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016 as a bridging financing mechanism and requested the Secretary-General to report at the seventy-first session on the use of the commitment authority. In the same resolution, the Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/70/7/Add.30), including the recommendation that alternative options be developed concerning the future financing arrangements for the Residual Court. The report addresses the use of the commitment authority granted for the Residual

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Court for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016 and reports on the result of the Secretary-General's consultations with stakeholders to propose comprehensive future funding solutions for the Court.

3. The Secretary-General recalls in his report that the Residual Special Court was established by the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone in August 2010, with the concurrence of the Security Council, to carry out a number of vital residual functions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Special Court was itself established in 2002 with the primary objective of prosecuting persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law, committed within the territory of Sierra Leone. The Special Court indicted 13 individuals. Three indicted persons died and one remains at large. Nine individuals, including the former President of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor, were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 15 to 52 years (A/71/386, para. 7).

4. The Residual Special Court commenced its operations on 1 January 2014, immediately following the closure of the Special Court, and carries out its functions at its interim seat in The Hague, with a sub-office in Freetown for witness protection and support and coordination of defence issues (ibid., para. 9). The functions of the Residual Special Court include investigations and an administrative hearing concerning the violation of conditional early release, the management and preservation of archives and completion of archiving work from the Special Court of Sierra Leone, engaging with witnesses to address their needs, supervision of the enforcement of sentences and responding to requests for information and evidence from national prosecuting authorities (ibid., para. 13).

II. Recent activities of the Residual Special Court

5. The Secretary-General indicates that since the commencement of the operations of the Residual Special Court, the focus has been to review and build on the necessary structures and systems for the proper functioning of the institution and develop additional personnel policies to regulate internal administrative matters. Furthermore, a headquarters agreement between the Netherlands and the Residual Court was ratified by the Parliament of the Netherlands, entering into force on 1 May 2016, and the Court began reviewing the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (ibid., paras. 10 to 11).

6. In terms of its functions, the Residual Court continues to actively monitor and support over 100 witnesses (ibid., para. 14), while continuing to hold judicial and administrative proceedings concerning the conditional early release applications of two applicants, pursuant to rule 124 of the Residual Court's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ibid., para. 15). The Residual Court also has the responsibility to supervise the enforcement of sentences for persons convicted by the Special Court, with seven convicts currently in custody, one in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and six in Rwanda (ibid., para. 24), and provides assistance to national prosecuting authorities. Further functions include the maintenance and storage of the archives, as well as access to the archives, the upgrading of the Residual Court's electronic records management software and the

holding the second plenary of judges, from 30 November to 4 December 2015 in The Hague, in order to review rules and procedures, hold judicial elections and approve the jurisprudential legacy project of the Appeals Chamber (ibid., paras. 29 to 32).

7. The Secretary-General indicates that preserving the legacy of the Special Court is an important element of the work of the Residual Court, including its standing as the first international criminal court in history to adjudicate cases on crimes relating to child soldiers, attacks on peacekeepers and forced marriage. In that regard, the report details the non-remunerated activities in which the judges and other officials of the Court have participated over the past year so as to promote the legacy of the Special Court (ibid., paras. 33 to 35).

III. Current financial situation, resource requirements and request for a subvention

8. The report indicates that intensive fundraising efforts by the Oversight Committee[1] and the principal officials of the Residual Court have continued in 2016. Efforts included targeted communications (letters and notes verbales) sent to Member States and regional organizations, as well as the holding of bilateral meetings and briefings at different levels, drawing the attention of Member States and organizations to the dire funding situation of the Residual Court. However, as of the date of the report, no voluntary contributions or pledges had been received for 2017 (ibid., paras. 49 to 53).

9. **The Advisory Committee recognizes the efforts made by the Residual Special Court to raise funds to cover the costs of its ongoing operations. In view of the persistent funding challenges faced by the Residual Special Court, the Committee stresses the ongoing need for intensified fundraising efforts by the Secretary-General, including by broadening the donor base for the Residual Special Court.**

10. The Secretary-General indicates that, as at 31 December 2016, the Residual Special Court expects that, out of the $2,438,500 in commitment authority, an amount of $1,444,400 would have been utilized during the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016. Accordingly, the utilized portion of the commitment would be reported in the context of the first performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 for appropriation (ibid., para. 5). The total resource requirements of the Residual Court for 2017 are estimated at $2,980,500, representing the entire subvention request, as no voluntary contributions are forecasted for the remainder of 2016 or for 2017. In the light of the current financial situation of the Residual Court, the Secretary-General indicates that the Court would be unable to continue its work in 2017 without the approval of an additional subvention (ibid., para. 37).

[1] The Oversight Committee is composed of the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations and significant contributors to the Residual Court. Currently, the Oversight Committee is composed of Canada, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

11. In connection with the Residual Court's ongoing resource requirements, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the review and approval of the budget of the Court is a function of the Oversight Committee, composed of the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations and significant contributors to the Residual Court, and that officials of the Court consult the Oversight Committee on matters concerning the management of the Court. The Oversight Committee also assists the Residual Court in obtaining funding and provides advice and policy direction on all non-judicial aspects of the operation of the Court.

12. **While recognizing that requests for a subvention do not constitute formal budget proposals, the Advisory Committee reiterates its view that, as a matter of general principle, any request for a subvention from the regular budget should be fully justified (see A/70/7/Add.30, para. 18). In the case of the Residual Special Court, this would allow the General Assembly to scrutinize its resource requirements and the staffing of the Residual Special Court, without prejudice to the voluntary nature of the current funding arrangements. Further, the Committee expects that the Residual Special Court will undertake all efforts to exercise budgetary discipline and to identify operational efficiencies.**

Staffing requirements

13. The report indicates that staffing requirements would consist of a total of 13 full-time staff based at the two locations, with the Residual Court relying on short-term consultancies, expert services, interns and pro bono services to supplement its staff resources as required:

(a) The office in The Hague, consisting of six staff members: one D-2 Registrar; one P-4 Prosecution Legal Adviser; one P-4 Legal Officer in the Registrar's Office; one P-1 Associate Legal Officer; one P-2 Archiving Officer; and one P-2 Office Manager. In addition, one General Service position, funded by general temporary assistance, will provide archiving assistance;

(b) The sub-office in Freetown, consisting of seven staff members: one P-4 Senior Legal Officer; one P-1 Associate Defence Legal Officer; three Witness Protection and Support Supervisors/Officers (National Professional Officers); one Administrative Assistant (Local level) and one Cleaner (Local level).

14. In addition, details on staffing requirements by category, level and location for 2017, inclusive of judicial functions, if required, are provided in annex III to the report (A/71/386). The report also indicates that the Registrar is the only senior full-time staff member of the Residual Special Court, with the President, judges (called from the roster as and when needed), Prosecutor and Principal Defender all working from off-site locations, only as necessary, and remunerated on a pro rata basis (ibid., para. 47).

15. The requirements for compensation to judges are estimated at $183,000 in 2017, with an increase of $108,400 compared to 2016. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the compensation for judges for 2017 comprises $53,300 for non-judicial functions and $129,700 for judicial functions. Notwithstanding the fact that judicial proceedings have not yet been held in 2016, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the amount would cover compensation for three judges for 2 months in the event of judicial activity in 2017. The Advisory Committee notes that the requirements reflect judicial activities that have not been undertaken in previous years.

16. **The Advisory Committee stresses that the Residual Special Court should adopt a more realistic approach to budgeting for judicial and other activities, reflecting the actual needs of the Residual Court, past experiences, as well as efforts to identify further efficiencies, without prejudice to the judicial requirements of the Residual Court.**

17. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the Oversight Committee had approved the budget for 2017 and that the posts of the Residual Court are not part of the staffing table under the programme budget of the United Nations. While the total number of posts has not changed for 2017, the report indicates that staff requirements include the post of Legal Officer, which was upgraded from a P-3 to a P-4 post, and the post of a cleaner at the local level in the Freetown office. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the Oversight Committee had approved the budget, including the post at the higher level. Justification regarding the necessity for a cleaner in an office staffed by seven staff members was not provided. **While recognizing that the staffing requirements are not being submitted for the approval of the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee stresses that, as a matter of principle, all staffing requirements, including the upgrading of posts, should be fully justified.**

Non-staffing requirements

18. The requirements for travel are estimated at $290,100 in 2017 compared with $182,710 in 2016. While the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that non-judicial related travel amounting to $122,600 (ibid., annex II) was required for various meetings, enforcements of sentences and foreign investigative travel, the Committee remains concerned at the escalating travel requirements. **Particularly in the light of the persistent scarcity of financial resources, the Advisory Committee stresses that the Residual Special Court should limit travel requirements to those directly associated with the core functions of the Residual Special Court through measures such as the combining of trips and the use of alternative means of communication, including videoconferencing. The Committee strongly stresses that the primary consideration in authorizing official travel should be whether direct face-to-face contact is necessary for mandate implementation (see also A/69/787, para. 29).**

19. The report indicates estimated requirements of $31,500 for consultants and experts, $591,000 for contractual services, of which $541,000 is for non-judicial services and $50,000 for judicial services (A/71/386, annex II). Of the $541,000, expenses for the technological platform provided by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the rental of office space amount to $379,700, while various other services and requirements, including security and liaising activities, constitute the remaining balance. Increases in common staff costs from an estimated $225,000 in 2016 to projected requirements of $403,300 in 2017 are also reflected in the report (A/71/386/Corr.1, table 2). As part of the efficiency measures implemented (A/71/386, paras. 46-48), the report indicates that the sub-office in Freetown is co-located with the National Witness Unit, and the interim seat of the Court in The Hague is co-located and continues to share an administrative and technical platform with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. **The Advisory Committee stresses that further efforts should be made to lower the costs of the Court and to identify efficiencies.**

IV. Future financing arrangements for the Residual Special Court

20. The Secretary-General provides information in his report on the alternative options for the future financial arrangements for the Residual Special Court and states that, given the temporary nature of any approved funding for 2017, a long-term solution to the financing of the Court is necessary. The Secretary-General indicates that the Secretariat engaged with the Government of Sierra Leone, the Oversight Committee of the Court, the Registrar of the Court and other stakeholders on alternative options for the future financing of the Residual Court (ibid., para. 6). The first option under consideration foresees the coverage of the Court's costs by the Government of Sierra Leone, as one of the parties to the Agreement on the Residual Special Court. The Secretary-General indicates that, owing to budgetary constraints arising from the crisis linked to the Ebola virus disease, the Government of Sierra Leone is not in a position to fund the Residual Court and would not be in a position to do so in the near future. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the Government did not indicate its ability to fund the Residual Court in the period following the recovery from Ebola. The report indicates, therefore, that this option is not viable. The Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the Government of Sierra Leone supports the work of the Residual Court by co-locating the Residual Court office in Freetown with the National Witness Unit, providing the use of the National Witness Unit staff services to the Court and the use of a court room in Freetown to the Court when required, at no cost to the Court, making available Sierra Leone police and prison officers to monitor the terms and conditions for prisoners granted early release by the Court and the use of the Government's detention facilities in Freetown.

21. The second option indicated in the report is the proposed funding of the Residual Court from United Nations resources, which, as indicated by the Secretary-General, is a matter that must be decided by the General Assembly, including the amount and form of the funding and the length of time it should continue to fund the Court (ibid., para. 59). The second option also includes the provision of administrative support to the Residual Court by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. The Secretary-General indicates that the Assembly has affirmed the high priority accorded to the work of the Residual Court and that its activities are carried out in furtherance of the purposes of the United Nations, in particular the maintenance of international peace and security, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (ibid., para. 60). The report also indicates that in addition to securing a stable source of funding, co-locating the court's offices in The Hague with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would allow more cost-effective and efficient administrative support to be provided to the Court on a reimbursable basis and would replicate the current arrangement with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ibid., paras. 61 to 64).

22. The report indicates that the Office of Legal Affairs is examining the possible inclusion of the Residual Court in the financing arrangements for the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, as previously suggested by the Advisory Committee (A/67/648, para. 22). **The Advisory Committee stresses the need for a sustainable long-term financing solution for the Residual Special**

Court, given that its existence will be determined by key functions linked to the enforcement of sentences and the continued presence of witnesses subject to protective measures.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

23. The Advisory Committee again recalls its concern regarding the sustainability of voluntary contributions to fund the activities of the Residual Special Court and legacy activities (A/70/7/Add.30, para. 21). The Committee acknowledges the efforts to examine alternative financing options for the residual activities of the Special Court but considers that further analysis and development of existing options, as well as the possible identification of other options, is required. In particular, the Advisory Committee points out the long-term implications of co-locating the Residual Court's offices with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in The Hague or, alternatively, in Arusha. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to further analyse the options in greater detail, develop additional alternatives concerning the long-term arrangements for the Residual Special Court and to report thereon in the context of the Secretary-General's provision of details on the use of the commitment authority.

24. In view of the projected funding shortfall for 2017, the concerns raised by the Advisory Committee regarding budgetary discipline and operational efficiencies in the paragraphs above, the absence of pledges and contributions and the urgent need for resources to ensure the continued operations of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments, as a bridging financing mechanism, in an amount not to exceed $2,800,000, in order to supplement voluntary financial resources of the Residual Special Court for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017. The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to report, during the main part of its seventy-second session, on the use of the commitment authority.

25. The Advisory Committee notes that the final use of the commitment authority would depend upon the receipt of voluntary contributions from donors. The Advisory Committee continues to stress that its recommendations are made on the basis that:

(a) The Residual Special Court continues its efforts to seek voluntary contributions;

(b) If voluntary contributions are received in excess of the remaining requirements for the Residual Special Court for 2017, any corresponding funding provided under the commitment authority to the Residual Special Court for the period would be refunded to the United Nations;

(c) Appropriate measures for achieving efficiencies in the Residual Special Court are taken.